EXHIBIT 47


In Re:

ONEWEB GLOBAL LIMITED, et al. Main Case No. 20-22437-rdd

July 28, 2020

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| 2 | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT | |
| 3 | SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | |
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| 6 | In the Matter of: | |
| 7 | ONEWEB GLOBAL LIMITED, et al., Main Case No. | |
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| 12 | United States Bankruptcy Court | |
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| 21 | BEFORE: | |
| 22 | HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN | |
| 23 24 | U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE | |
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1 2 Notice of Agenda for Matters Scheduled for July 28, 2020, at 3 1:00 PM 4 Motion to Extend Time / Notice of Debtors' Motion to Extend the 5 6 Debtors' Exclusive Periods to File a Chapter 11 Plan and 7 Solicit Acceptances Thereof Pursuant to Section 1121 of the 8 Bankruptcy Code (ECF #395) 9 10 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Limited Objection to 11 Debtors' Motion to Extend Debtors' Exclusive Periods to file a 12 Chapter 11 Plan and Solicit Acceptances Thereof Pursuant to 13 Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code (related document(s)395) 14 filed by Luc A. Despins on behalf of Official Committee of 15 Unsecured Creditors (ECF 419) 16 17 Debtors' Reply to the Committee's Objection to the Motion To 18 Extend Their Exclusive Periods to File a Chapter 11 Plan and 19 Solicit Acceptances Thereof (related document(s)395, 419) filed by Lauren C. Doyle on behalf of OneWeb Global Limited (ECF 20 21 #440) 22 Motion for Order Granting Committee Derivative Standing to 23 24 Pursue and, if Appropriate, Settle Claims for 25 Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination Against Certain

1 Purported Secured Creditors, and (II) Objection to Such 2 3 Creditors' Claims (related document(s)402) 4 Softbank Group Corp.'s Objection to the Official Committee of 5 6 Unsecured Creditors' (I) Motion for Order Granting Committee 7 Derivative Standing to Pursue, and if Appropriate, Settle Claims for Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination 8 Against Certain Purported Secured Creditors, and (II) Objection 9 10 to Such Creditors' Claims (related document(s)402) filed by Gary S. Lee on behalf of SoftBank Group Corporation (ECF #427) 11 12 Joinder and Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the 13 14 Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors' (I) Motion For Order 15 Granting Committee Derivative Standing to Pursue and, if 16 Appropriate, Settle Claims for Recharacterization and Equitable 17 Subordination Against Certain Purported Secured Creditors and 18 (Ii) Objection to Such Creditors' Claims (related 19 document(s)402) filed by Timothy Q. Karcher on behalf of Grupo Elektra S.A.B. de C.V. (ECF #428) 20 21 22 Joinder of Airbus Group Proj B.V. to the Softbank Group Corp.'s Objection to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' (I) 23 24 Motion for Order Granting Committee Derivative Standing to 25 Pursue and, if Appropriate, Settle Claims for

1 2 Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination Against Certain Purported Secured Creditors, and (II) Objection to Such 3 4 Creditors' Claims (related document(s)402, 427) filed by Michael C. Hefter on behalf of Airbus Group Proj B.V. (ECF 5 6 #429) 7 8 Debtors' Objection to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' (I) Motion for Order Granting Committee Derivative 9 10 Standing to Pursue, and if Appropriate, Settle Claims for Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination Against Certain 11 12 Purported Secured Creditors, and (II) Objection to Such 13 Creditors' Claims (related document(s)402) filed by Lauren C. 14 Doyle on behalf of OneWeb Global Limited (ECF 430) 15 16 Joinder of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. and Qualcomm Global 17 Trading PTE. Ltd to the Debtors' and Softbank Group Corp.'s 18 Objections to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' 19 Motion for Derivative Standing to Pursue Recharacterization and Subordination of Certain Secured Creditors' Claims and 20 21 Objections Thereto (related document(s)402, 430, 427) filed by 22 Rachel Ehrlich Albanese on behalf of Qualcomm Technologies, 23 Inc. and Qualcomm Global Trading Pte. Ltd. (ECF #440) 24 25 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Motion for an Order

1 2 Authorizing the Committee to Exceed the Page Limit for the 3 Committee's Reply in Support of Motion for Order Granting 4 Committee Derivative Standing to Pursue and, if Appropriate, Settle Claims for Recharacterization and Equitable 5 Subordination against Certain Purported Secured Creditors filed 6 7 by Luc A. Despins on behalf of Official Committee of Unsecured 8 Creditors (ECF #422) 9 10 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' Reply in Support of 11 Motion for Order Granting Committee Derivative Standing to 12 Pursue and, if Appropriate, Settle Claims for 13 Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination against Certain Purported Secured Creditors (related document(s)402) filed by 14 Luc A. Despins on behalf of Official Committee of Unsecured 15 16 Creditors (ECF #445) 17 18 19 20 Transcribed by: Linda Ferrara 21 eScribers, LLC 22 352 Seventh Avenue, Suite #604 23 New York, NY 10001 24 (973)406-2250 25 operations@escribers.net

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the time period that we agreed to.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay, anyone else in objection to the motion? Okay, Mr. Despins, just briefly, if you want to say something.

MR. DESPINS: Yeah, I'll try to cover a lot of stuff. I'll start from what was just covered, so that it's fresh in your memory. First of all, the document we quoted from is not post-bankruptcy. It was February, and it clearly shows that the important thing for them was that the form was always something that showed a loan. And that that was their goal, and that's why we cited it.

And I'm not going to address the discovery thing, other than to say we had no ability to test whether the discovery was complete because of when it was produced. And it was clearly in violation of the court order.

In terms of the Yoga case, it's true that Judge Wiles said that. But the point is that that seems to basically go to the issue that the subjective belief of a party is what controls here. And there's nothing further from what the analysis should be. It can't be that.

Then the point about the maturity being in 2023, that's true, but the point is that the fuel they're providing for the plane could not get them to that point and could not get them to a point where any revenues would occur. That's the key. We're not asking for a bright-line test that you cannot

finance a startup. There's just so many differentiating factors here that make it not applicable.

Now, the issue of control by SoftBank, they say oh, look, we had this side letter with the Mexican lender. And by the way, it's not an accident that it was Banco Azteca that was put in there. It was all controlled by the same people at Salinas and decided to put that entity. But it has nothing to do with it being a bank or anything like that.

Now, the issue of SoftBank being in control and no, that's not the case because there was a side letter. So now they're telling you there's two side letters. That leaves three lenders that don't have the side letters. And by the way, Your Honor, I know you'll look at this. The side letter doesn't do any good for them. And it's true, it says you can't exchange principal and all that, but it does not govern remedies.

Remedies are governed by SoftBank. So SoftBank, they can be in default, the money is due, they control the exercise of remedies. And these guys did not cover that, and that shows the point is that SoftBank is in complete control of that. And you would never have a lender put another lender in complete control of remedies when you're in full default.

The issue of -- now, let me now go to Mr. LeBlanc's point. Your Honor, we tried to be nice about this. But there are huge corporate-governance issues here. This is rife with

conflict. Mr. LeBlanc said he wasn't clear whether the four million and change was approved at the same time as the DIP.

I'm sure they were discussing the DIP at that time, let's not kid ourselves, because that's two days before the filing.

And two, at that time, or soon thereafter, they're discussing the KEIP, and SoftBank negotiated the KEIP, and of course, now we know that they're getting -- that the debtors are giving them a release as part of the plan support agreement. It's basically a group scratching each other's backs, and that should be very troubling with the Court. It's all linked. It's all related.

The whole argument about highly damaging, the parade of horribles, is not accurate. The ninety million is fully protected, meaning that the bidder cannot do anything about that. That money is gone, as you said.

As to the hundred million dollars, again, we would cross that bridge if and when we get to it. The fact that you authorized us to recharacterize or to attempt to recharacterize 1.7 billion dollars of debt does not address remedies.

Remedies can be addressed later.

Now, I want to address where I think you're heading, Your Honor, which is the issue of the assumption of contracts, right? If everyone's contracts were assumed, this issue might, in theory, go away. First of all, I don't believe that for a second that it will happen, but not only that, but it's going

to be too late. They're doing this five days before confirmation. And it is true that in a normal cooperative environment you would try to say hey, let's wait for the bar date. Let's analyze the claims. You would do that jointly, and there would be a joint effort. But that's not what's happening here. I guarantee you, they will try to jam the committee so that the committee, for example, will cease to exist on the petition date, so therefore cannot be a plaintiff anymore. Not petition date. On the confirmation date or the effective date. So it cannot be a plaintiff anymore.

There'll be no funding. There'll be tons of roadblocks that they will put in, which forces us to push the issue today. But I can see that you're reluctant, and I can -- I, sort of, see that, and it makes sense if, in fact, there was a way to protect the committee, protect the creditors, so they can see what's behind the curtain, whether it's real or not.

At the end of the day, I believe there'll be at least twenty -- thirty million dollars of claims that are not being assumed by the buyer. So the question is, Mr. Leblanc is basically saying well, just too bad for these people. We'll just let them go. The committee cannot do that. That would be inappropriate. And on the facts here, where you have this hopelessly conflicted group of people, it cannot be the result. And we hope Your Honor is sensitive to that.

And I just want to end by saying that we're not trying

to establish a bright-line test that says that startup financing isn't possible, but the facts here are just so compelling that we believe that there will be no impact, practically, on startup financing.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I have before me the official unsecured creditors' committee's motion to be accorded standing to pursue, on a derivative basis, and, if appropriate, settle claims against the defendants in a proposed complaint that's attached to the motion for recharacterization of the defendants secured claims in these bankruptcy cases to equity under federal law and/or alternatively, to equitably subordinate the claims to the claims of the general unsecured creditors under Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

I should note that the motion also includes a request, then on the basis of the complaint, although it needn't be on a complaint necessarily, for an order disallowing the defendants' claims under Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, again, on the grounds that they are equity interests.

This is a topic, this latter point, that has not been addressed, as far as I can tell, above the bankruptcy court level, and I don't think, in the Southern District of New York. To the extent it has been addressed at all, most of the time it's addressed in the context of the proper standard for a recharacterization motion, i.e. whether the motion or the

adversary proceeding should be considered under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, or alternatively, under Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the distinction being the case, in most courts' analysis, if disallowance is being pursued under Section 502(b), the analysis might well be under applicable nonbankruptcy law, i.e. state law in most instances.

Most courts have concluded that the proper analysis is under 105(a) generally and is not focused on the fact that there are two options under the Bankruptcy Code. They have just said that if someone is seeking recharacterization, and they say they want to do it under Section 105, they can. See In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 789 F.3d 1139, 1147-1149 (10th Cir. 2015).

On the other hand, the authorities that I've located that deal with the standing issue under Section 502(b) have made it clear, and I agree with them, that there's no limitation on a parties-in-interest's standing, except a constitutional limitation, i.e. that they are the party aggrieved to pursue recharacterization under Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code as part of a claim objection. See In re Tara Retail Group, LLC, 595 B.R. 215, 222-223 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2018). United States v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 520 B.R. 29, 72 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). And In re Brooke Capital Corp, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 210, at *23 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2011).

A court does have other means to control its calendar and to try to ensure that litigation is not pursued by parties that are acting as a fiduciary and/or being paid by the estate separate and apart from standing, and conceivably that applies here with regard to the 502(b) portion of the relief sought by the committee, but it's not a standing issue or an issue that pertains to standing.

No objecting party has objected to that portion of the committee's request. I think the reason is obvious. There's no basis to object on a standing ground.

So at some level, the arguments over standing are, although, perhaps, important for the course of this case, kind of, in a very strict sense, not dispositive here. I'll keep that in mind with regard to my ruling on standing.

But turning to the motion's request to obtain standing, under the case law in the Second Circuit there are two basic scenarios in which a creditors' committee or another party-in-interest can obtain standing to pursue claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. One is where the debtor consents to a third party bringing suit, which, of course, is not applicable here, and the other is when the debtor-in-possession unjustifiably refuses to bring an action against some third party. See, for example, In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, (2d Cir. 1985) and the trio of cases following it, including In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 544 F.3d 420,

424 (2d Cir. 2008).

Fiduciary considerations are of the utmost importance in considering expanding standing to someone beyond the initial and primary fiduciary for debtors' estate, namely the debtorin-possession. The Second Circuit has recognized, though, that there are times when a debtor-in-possession may not always fulfill its responsibilities and may unjustifiably fail to bring valid claims or abuse its discretion by not suing. Id. 544 F.3d 424.

The court went on to say, however, it is the court's role and not that of a derivative plaintiff both to oversee the litigation and to check any potential for abuse by the parties, i.e. the court has to make ultimately a decision whether, in exercising its fiduciary duties, the debtor is acting properly in not bringing litigation. And the flip side, the third party would not be a good steward of the estate's resources in bringing litigation, or to the contrary, the debtor is unjustifiably, in light of its fiduciary duties, refusing to bring the litigation, and the requesting plaintiff is, in fact, or would, in fact, act as a proper fiduciary.

The standard to evaluate a standing motion in the Second Circuit is well established. Again, it goes back to the seminal case In re STN Enterprises. Here, "if the committee presents a colorable claim or claims for relief that on appropriate proof would support a recovery, the court's

threshold inquiry will not be at an end. In order to decide whether the debtor unjustifiably failed to bring suit so as to give the creditors' committee standing to bring an action, the court must also examine, on affidavit and other submission, by evidentiary hearing or otherwise, whether an action asserting such claim is likely to benefit the reorganization estate."

779 F.2d 905.

But the Court engages in an analysis in which it looks at whether there is a colorable claim that the committee wants to bring, that its pursuit of that claim is likely to benefit the estate and to the extent the inquiry isn't subsumed in that second factor, whether the trustee or debtor-in-possession has unjustifiably failed to pursue it.

The quantum of proof is flexible for such an analysis. Clearly the Second Circuit in STN acknowledged that the court may properly engage in some review of disputed facts to determine if there is proper factual support for the allegation and to determine if the proposed litigation would be a sensible application of estate resources. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 562 B.R. 211, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), and In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 330 B.R. 364, 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

This does not require a minitrial, but as noted by the Circuit, the bankruptcy court should assure itself that there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the anticipated delay and expense to the bankruptcy estate that the

initiation and continuation of litigation would likely produce. In re STN, 779 F.2d 905, 906.

The first part of the analysis, that the claims be colorable, has been noted as a relatively easy one to make, In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 330 B.R. 376, and is often equated with the standard of considering a motion to dismiss. It's not necessarily limited to that consideration, however, particularly where the standing motion is raised early in a bankruptcy case, and there has not been the type of bankruptcy discovery under Rule 2004 that would normally inform a complaint in a Chapter 11 case of this nature.

We are relatively early in this Chapter 11 case. The committee, I guess it's had about a month to conduct discovery under Bankruptcy rule 2004, given the deadline it faced under the debtor-in-possession order from April. It has not taken depositions. It has obtained a fair amount of document discovery, but that discovery has pertained to at least two relatively complex, factually that is, determinations with respect to credit facilities that are the subject of the proposed complaint.

The objectors contend that under the applicable case law, which, at the Circuit level, is really outside of the Second Circuit and based on two leading cases. In re Submicron Systems Corp., 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006) and In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2000), that on a motion

to dismiss or colorable claims analysis, that there is no colorable claim here for recharacterization or equitable subordination.

Courts in the Second Circuit at the district court and bankruptcy court level, and frankly, also in the Third Circuit, even after Submicron, often include an analysis of the so-called Autostyle factors for determining whether a debt claim should be recharacterized as equity.

The objectors here argue that the secured loans should clearly not be recharacterized on their merits, where the committee, applying the same basic analysis, contends that, at a minimum, they state colorable claims for purposes of the STN analysis.

Similarly, the parties disagree over whether the complaint separately sets forth a claim for equitable subordination under Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Both of those causes of action seek essentially the same ultimate result, which is recharacterization of the loan transaction in a way that puts them behind general unsecured claims, but the tests are different, as noted by the Fourth Circuit In re Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc., 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006).

Equitable subordination differs markedly and serves different purposes from recharacterization. While a bankruptcy court's recharacterization decision rests on the substance of